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THE FUNDING EFFECT IN SCIENCE AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JUDICIARY 
Sheldon Krimsky, Ph.D.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Public policies and legal decisions implemented during the 
1980s have created new incentives for universities, publicly-
supported nonprofit institutes, and their faculties to commercialize 
scientific and medical research. Academic-industry and nonprofit-
for-profit collaborations have led to the development of revised 
institutional norms that accommodate new organizational 
relationships. Among the most pronounced changes, which have 
been documented in a number of research studies, are that secrecy 
has replaced openness, privatization of knowledge has replaced 
communitarian values, and the commodification of discovery has 
replaced the norm that university-generated knowledge is a free 
good that is part of the intellectual commons.1 
                                                          
 * Sheldon Krimsky is professor in the Department of Urban & 
Environmental Policy & Planning in the School of Arts & Sciences, and Adjunct 
Professor in the Department of Family Medicine and Public Health in the School 
of Medicine, Tufts University. He is the author of SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE 
INTEREST and co-editor of a forthcoming volume RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE 
BIOTECH AGE. 
1 See David Blumenthal et al., University-Industry Research Relationships 
in Biotechnology: Implications for the University, 232 SCIENCE 1361 (June 13, 
1986) (discussing study of research university faculty and the effect of industry 
support for research on several issues, including secrecy); Eric G. Campbell et 
al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence From a National Survey, 
287 JAMA 473, 473 (Jan. 23, 2002) (discussing study of trend among geneticists 
of withholding data from other scientists and the effects of such behavior on 
research); Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and 
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539 (May 18, 2000). 
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The rapid growth of academic entrepreneurship has given rise 
to new concerns about scientific conflict of interest, especially in 
areas such as public health and medicine, in which the public has a 
direct personal stake.2 Conflicts of interest among scientists, rarely 
discussed prior to 1980, have been linked to research bias as well 
as the loss of a socially valuable norm among academic 
researchers, namely “disinterestedness.”3 
It should be noted, however, that academic entrepreneurship is 
not without precedent. As early as 1968, James Ridgeway 
described the growth of new consulting enterprises in his book The 
Closed Corporation. Ridgeway wrote that, in recent years, 
professors have started a number of new kinds of companies 
involved in social problem solving, so the idea that the university 
is a community of scholars is a myth. Ridgeway elaborated: 
Professors are a new priesthood . . . whose ideas are the 
drive wheels of the Great Society; shaping our defenses, 
guiding our foreign policy, redesigning our cities, 
reorganizing our schools, deciding what our dollar is worth. 
As power brokers, the professors act with one hand on the 
university and the other on a big corporation; they move in 
and out using their prestige as scholars to advance interests 
of the company.4 
Whereas older academic entrepreneurship concentrated on faculty-
formed consulting enterprises and startup companies in decision 
sciences and electronics, newer academic enterprise zones have 
concentrated in the biomedical sciences and medicine, where the 
stakes are higher and the public’s concern about scientific integrity 
is greater.5 
Mainstream science is now beginning to question how conflicts 
                                                          
2 Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1516 (May 18, 2000). 
3 JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE 161 (2000). 
4 JAMES RIDGEWAY, THE CLOSED CORPORATION 84 (1968). 
5 Susan Ehringhaus & David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects 
Research, in ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ONLINE, Winter 2002, 
available at www.issues.org/issues/19.2/ehringhaus.htm; See also COMM. ON 
GOV’T OPERATIONS, ARE SCIENTIFIC ‘MISCONDUCT’ AND CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST HAZARDOUS TO OUR HEALTH?, H.R. REP. NO. 101-688 (1990). 
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of interest enter into professional activities, including publication, 
peer review, government advisory committees, federal science 
agencies, clinical trials, and expert testimony in the courts. Leaders 
in the scientific community are not ready to jettison the idea of 
“disinterested science” and “objectivity.” Donald Kennedy, editor-
in-chief of Science, recently wrote about the public’s growing 
interest in the integrity of science: “Society is now concerned with 
possible sources of bias and seeks assurance through disclosure 
that the data or opinions presented are those of a disinterested 
party.”6 In December 2003, the Los Angeles Times ran a series of 
stories about conflicts of interest at the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation, where high-
level scientific laboratory and program supervisors were cashing in 
on patents and business connections with drug companies.7 The 
L.A. Times editorial criticized NIH for becoming “an arm of 
commerce.”8 The editorial described the NIH as “a place where 
objective science is being trampled in a stampede for market 
share” and where “scientists brazenly collect paychecks and stock 
options from biomedical companies, and do so with the blessing of 
their leaders.”9 
These comments hardly penetrate the surface of the public ire 
that has been directed at the commercialization of academic 
science. Public outcry has led to litigation, congressional hearings, 
dozens of investigative reports in the media, books, editorials in 
science journals, and new federal policies for addressing conflicts 
                                                          
6 Donald Kennedy, Disclosure and Disinterest, 303 SCIENCE 14 (Jan. 2, 
2004) (noting that “society is now concerned with possible sources of bias and 
seeks assurance through disclosure that the data or opinions presented are those 
of a disinterested party”). 
7 See, e.g., David Willman, Records of Payments to NIH Staff Sought, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A12, available at 2003 WL 68903373; David Willman, 
Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical Research, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003 at A1, available at 2003 WL 68902911; Editorial, 
Subverting U.S. Health, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003 at M4, available at 2003 WL 
68903050 [hereinafter Editorial, Subverting U.S. Health]; Alan Zarembo, 
Funding Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003 at A1, available at 2003 
WL 68902206.. 
8 Editorial, Subverting U.S. Health, supra note 7, at M4. 
9 Id. 
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of interest.10 In this paper, I discuss the effects of the academic 
funding structure and financial conflicts of interest on the integrity 
of scientific research. Additionally, I examine the influence of 
conflicts of interest on the courtroom testimony of experts and 
suggest ways in which judicial and scientific methodologies can 
look to each other to enhance objectivity. The central issues 
underlying this analysis include whether scientific conflicts of 
interests make a difference in the quality of science, whether 
objectivity is threatened by the growth of scientific 
entrepreneurship, whether judicial proceedings should be attentive 
to conflicts of interest in expert testimony, whether disclosure is a 
sufficient antidote, and whether objectivity can prevail when all 
interests are transparent. 
I. LAW AND SCIENCE: TWO MODELS OF EPISTEMOLOGY 
It is fair to say that the judicial system and the scientific system 
are both about getting to the truth. Sheila Jasanoff notes: “[T]he 
ways in which truth is found in each location is through 
establishing a direct correspondence with some exogenous reality: 
with a legally significant event in the case of law, and with a 
phenomenon of nature in the case of science.”11 However, science 
and law take quite distinct structural paths to arrive at their 
respective truths. 
The judicial path is organized around a system of legal 
advocacy. Each advocate builds an evidentiary edifice intended to 
falsify or validate a causal story or a truth claim within that story. 
The advocate lawyer is not expected to be balanced, self-critical, or 
inclusive of all evidence, but rather to serve his or her client in the 
best way possible. When a legal brief cites evidence that does not 
support a client’s claim, it is usually to dispute, invalidate, or 
provide a different interpretation of that evidence. The public 
                                                          
10 See, e.g., Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, March 2000, at 39-54; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 14; 
Ehringhaus & Korn, supra note 5. 
11 Sheila Jasanoff, Contested Science in Legal Settings, Remarks at the 
Coronado Conference “Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy” (San Diego, 
CA) (March 13, 2003) (transcript available from author). 
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expects that lawyers are paid by their clients to advocate for a 
particular truth narrative. In fact, professional norms prohibit 
lawyers from simultaneously representing competing interests.12 
There are, however, important groundrules in legal epistemology. 
For example, lawyers and forensic investigators cannot destroy or 
manufacture evidence.13 Additionally, they must make evidence 
available to others for analysis and interpretation. 
The judicial model creates a decision space for an objective 
review of evidence by disinterested observers who are neither 
forensic investigators nor the creators of the causal narratives. 
Since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, federal judges 
have played a more critical role in ascertaining the reliability of 
scientists and the science presented to interpret relevant evidence.14 
Within the judicial model, either the judge or jury renders a 
determination regarding the truth or probability of a given causal 
narrative through the use of evidentiary standards that are 
determined by the nature of the litigation. Undoubtedly, financial 
resources can play a role in the court’s truth determination. After a 
decision has been rendered, legal advocates may pursue a reversal 
of the court’s truth narrative by introducing new evidence or by 
questioning the methodology or process under which the inquiry 
took place.15 
In science, by contrast, the operative methodological norm is 
                                                          
12 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2002). 
13 Jasanoff, supra note 11. 
14 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding that the general acceptance of a scientific 
technique is not a precondition for admission of expert testimony based upon 
that technique so long as the standards of reliability and relevance under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence are met). The Court, in Daubert, listed several factors 
that federal judges should consider when determining the admissibility of expert 
testimony. Id. at 590-97. These factors, often referred to as the Daubert test, 
include whether the expert’s theory is capable of being tested; whether the 
theory “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; the “known or 
potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards 
controlling the technique’s operation”; and whether the theory has been 
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. Id. at 593-94 (internal 
citations omitted). 
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
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not advocacy but “organized skepticism.”16 As early as 1937, 
Robert Merton highlighted this norm as an essential component of 
scientific inquiry: “Organized skepticism [sic] involves a latent 
questioning of certain bases of established routine, authority, 
vested procedures and the realm of the ‘sacred’ generally . . . . 
Most institutions demand unqualified faith; but the institution of 
science makes skepticism a virtue.”17 Scientists as a community 
are expected to approach new truth claims with a critical eye 
toward the limitations of evidence and the falsifiability of the 
causal hypothesis. Scientists who fail to cite data that are 
unfavorable to their hypotheses are viewed as negligent or biased. 
Protecting the integrity of good evidence is valued, while harsh 
penalties are meted out for “cooking” or tampering with data.18 
In keeping with this structure of skeptical independence, 
scientists who receive private funds for their work, unlike lawyers, 
are not supposed to speak solo voce for the values and interests of 
their sponsors. However, when private funders contract with 
academic scientists, hidden covenants sometimes demand greater 
fidelity to sponsors than professional standards would permit. 
Consider the case of Professor Betty Dong, a pharmacologist at the 
University of California at San Francisco.19 A pharmaceutical 
company contacted Dong after a letter she had co-authored 
appeared in a medical journal.20 The letter reported differences in 
the effectiveness of various pharmaceutical drugs in treating 
hypothyroidism and cited two brand name preparations as having 
greater benefits than the generic drugs, which had been gaining 
                                                          
16 Robert Merton, Science in the Social Order, in SOCIAL THEORY AND 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 547 (Robert Merton ed., 1957). 
17 Id. 
18 THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE: ENSURING THE 
INTEGRITY OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS 2, 3 (NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 1992). 
19 This case is discussed fully in SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE 
PRIVATE INTEREST 14-18 (2003). See also Ralph T. King, Jr., Bitter Pill: How a 
Drug Firm Paid for University Study, Then Undermined It, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
25, 1996 at A1; Lawrence K. Altman, Drug Firm, Relenting, Allows 
Unflattering Study to Appear, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at Al. 
20 See Miriam Shuchman, Consequences of Blowing the Whistle in Medical 
Research, 132 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1013-14 (2000). 
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market share from the major brands.21 A manufacturer of one of 
the leading brand name drugs signed a contract with Dong to 
undertake a bioequivalency study, which the company hoped 
would demonstrate that its formulation was superior to the generic 
drugs on the market.22 
Dong completed a double-blind study in 1990 and sent the 
results to the company that sponsored it.23 Dong’s results showed 
that, for the four drugs she studied, there was no difference in the 
therapeutic effectiveness of the generics and the brand name 
drug.24 When Dong notified the company that funded the study of 
her findings, it disputed her results and indicated that her study was 
flawed.25 Dong submitted a paper describing her study to the 
Journal of the American Medical Association.26 It was peer 
reviewed by five individuals, revised, and accepted for 
publication.27 Prior to publication, Dong’s corporate sponsor 
warned her that she could not publish the results of the study 
without its permission because of a restrictive covenant in her 
contract.28 In relevant part, the covenant stated: 
All information contained in this protocol is confidential 
and is to be used by the investigator only for the conduct of 
this study. Data obtained by the investigator while carrying 
out this study is also considered confidential and is not to 
be published or otherwise released without written consent 
from Flint Laboratories, Inc.29 
Fearing costly litigation, Dong withdrew the article after the 
                                                          
21 Id. 
22 Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238 (1997). 
23 A double-blind study in this case means that neither the subjects nor the 
researchers know which subjects received the drug and which received the 
placebos and in what order the drugs were administered. Double-blind studies 
are the gold standard for medical research. 
24 Rennie, supra note 22, at 1238. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1239-43. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Rennie, supra note 22, at 1239. 
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journal had already prepared galleys of the work.30 
Dong’s case attracted international attention to the question of 
control over the scientific data of sponsored studies. The attorneys 
general of thirty-seven states filed a class action suit against Flint 
Laboratories, claiming that the company had withheld information 
from the Food and Drug Administration and disseminated 
misleading information about its product.31 The company agreed to 
pay approximately $98 million to users of its drug.32 
To date, universities continue to sign contracts with restrictive 
covenants regarding the control of data and publication. A small 
group of journals associated with the International Committee for 
Medical Journal Editors (ICJME) has agreed that articles submitted 
to the journals on the results of clinical trials should have signed 
statements by authors stating that they, not the sponsors, have 
control over the data.33 The editors of the ICJME journals were 
quite explicit about their disapproval of restrictive covenants in 
sponsored drug studies: 
Such arrangements not only erode the fabric of intellectual 
inquiry that has fostered so much high quality clinical 
research, but also make medical journals party to potential 
misrepresentation, since the published manuscript may not 
reveal the extent to which the authors were powerless to 
control the contact of a study that bears their names. 34 
                                                          
30 The paper was published years later. See Betty Dong et al., 
Bioequivalence of Generic and Brand-Name Levothyroxine Products in the 
Treatment of Hypothyroidism, 277 JAMA 1205 (1997). 
31 KRIMSKY, supra note 19, at 18. 
32 Id. 
33 Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability, 345 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 825, 825 (2001) (“As editors, we strongly oppose contractual 
agreements that deny investigators the right to examine the data independently 
or to submit a manuscript for publication without first obtaining the consent of 
the sponsor.”). 
34 Id. at 825-26. (stating “[w]e will not review or publish articles based on 
studies that are conducted under conditions that allow the sponsor to have sole 
control of the data or to withhold publication”). 
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II. THE ROLE OF DISINTERESTEDNESS IN SCIENCE 
The rejection of bias and advocacy in science is longstanding. 
Sir Karl Popper, one of the leading philosophers of science of the 
twentieth century, wrote that the logic of scientific discovery and 
the growth of science are based on the falsification of 
hypotheses.35 Scientists should not be in the business of trying to 
confirm their hypotheses by consciously seeking data to support 
them in the way that a prosecutor might gather evidence to prove 
that a defendant is guilty. Instead, Popper argues, scientists should 
hold their hypotheses to the most rigorous examination, as if the 
hypothesis were a combatant and the scientist’s role was to expose 
its vulnerability.36 
The culture of science, however, does not generally conform to 
Popper’s description of its proper role. The tension that builds 
within science is not between a scientist and his hypothesis, but 
among scientists as a community of skeptics who choose to 
interpret the evidence differently, see flaws in a theory, or question 
a methodology. The social systems of science have built incentives 
for doing what Popper rails against, namely demonstrating the 
truth of a hypothesis or getting positive results from an experiment. 
Journals typically do not publish negative results; grants are not 
usually awarded because someone failed to get a positive outcome 
in an experiment; and scientific review panels do not seek out 
negative results. From a psychosocial perspective, the gratification 
                                                          
35 KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 280 (2d ed. 1968). 
Popper explains: 
The advance of science is not due to the fact that more and more 
perpetual experiences accumulate in the course of time . . . Bold ideas, 
unjustified anticipations, and speculative thought, are our only means 
for interpreting nature: our only organon, our only instrument, for 
grasping her. And we must hazard them to win our prize. Those among 
us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the hazard of refutation do 
not take part in the scientific game. 
Id. 
36 Id. at 279. According to Popper, hypotheses are not to be “dogmatically 
upheld. On the contrary, we try to overthrow them . . . in order to put forward, in 
their stead, new unjustified and unjustifiable” hypotheses. Id. 
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and rewards in science will not be the same for someone who 
destroys theories and hypotheses as for someone who builds them. 
Scientists are not disinterested ideal observers when it comes to 
their own contributions, but rather are people with personal 
interests outside of science. They may, for example, be concerned 
about overpopulation or globalization. As John Ziman notes in 
Real Science, “[t]here is no denying that scientific facts and 
theories are produced by human beings, whose minds cannot be 
completely cleansed of individual interests.”37 According to 
Ziman, because science is a collective process, subjective elements 
are filtered out first by the socialization of researchers and then by 
the peer review process. Ultimately, it is the self-correcting 
function of science that serves as a balancing force because “the 
particular bias of each individual is neutralized in the collective 
outcome.”38 
It surely cannot be said that scientists are indifferent to the 
outcome of their work on intellectual or personal grounds. After 
all, science is a social system. Thus, the term “disinterestedness” 
must be viewed in this context. An individual scientist might be 
passionate about and even personally biased toward his theory. 
However, the system of science has no special interest in a 
particular theory being true or false; it only has an interest in 
pursuing the truth. Individual scientists may refuse to give up their 
hypotheses in light of falsifying evidence, but the social system of 
science is always prepared to jettison a theory that does not 
account for empirical evidence. Ziman believes that science’s 
“ethos” and “established practice” help to transform scientists’ 
personal conflicts of interest “into a shared collective interest in the 
production of reliable knowledge and in the anonymous, 
institutionalized credibility of that knowledge.”39 
For this transformation to occur, members of the scientific 
community must ascertain the biases that enter into a scientific 
investigation. They must be able to debate and reach consensus on 
controversial issues of data reliability and interpretation. 
                                                          
37 ZIMAN, supra note 3, at 155. 
38 Id. at 159. 
39 Id. at 161. 
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Intellectual interests of scientists are part of the published record 
and consequently, can be debated in the open literature. When a 
scientist has a financial interest in his or her work, however, the 
instrumental value of the conflict is not part of the scientific record 
and is not subject to debate. Instead, it falls outside the zone of 
“organized skepticism” that is generally placed on scientific 
findings. Scientists do not typically debate whether the 
entrepreneurial interests of a researcher could influence the 
objectivity of his published research. In many cases, these interests 
are not even known to the scientific community. Thus, the norm of 
“organized skepticism” does not operate on financial conflicts of 
interest. 
Importantly, a scientist’s entrepreneurial interests need not 
affect the objectivity of his or her research. Most scientists bristle 
at the allegation that their equity holdings in a company or a patent 
related to the subject matter of their research affect their 
objectivity, but this is an open empirical question. It is generally 
understood that certain fields of academic science have been 
heavily commercialized. John Ziman refers to these fields as “post-
academic science” because they have much closer ties to 
industry.40 In “post-academic science,” Ziman writes, “what cannot 
be denied is that the academic norm of disinterestedness no longer 
operates.”41 Ziman goes on to argue that the loss of individual 
disinterestedness will not derail the attainment of objectivity when 
the other norms are protected.42 
Ziman distinguishes between cognitive objectivity and social 
objectivity.43 The former refers to the true nature of physical 
reality, which science is supposed to reveal. Social objectivity, by 
contrast, is the public’s belief in the credibility of the knowledge 
                                                          
40 Id. at 67; See also John Ziman, No Conflict, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 4, 
2003, at 34. 
41 ZIMAN, supra note 3, at 174. 
42 Id. Ziman explains: “The production of objective knowledge thus 
depends less on genuine personal ‘disinterestedness’ than on the effective 
operation of the other norms, especially the norms of communalism, 
universalism and skepticism. So long as post-academic science abides by these 
norms, its long-term cognitive objectivity is not in serious doubt.” Id. 
43 Ziman, No Conflict, supra note 40, at 34. 
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claims. As long as “organized skepticism” is well and functioning 
(for example, through peer review, the self-correcting function of 
science, the replication of results, etc.), a scientist’s financial 
interests will not affect “cognitive objectivity.”44 However, 
science’s “reputation for short-term social objectivity” and its 
“hard-won reputation for a reasonable degree of impartiality, 
political neutrality and fairness” suffer when scientists fail to 
maintain disinterestedness.45 
While the legal advocacy system has long dealt with the effect 
of private, moneyed interests, the scientific epistemology is only 
recently coming to terms with this factor. Of course, there are 
many occasions in which company sponsors of research work 
closely with academic researchers on mutually agreed upon 
protocols. Companies frequently hire their own scientists who are 
often very knowledgeable in the fields of pharmacology, 
biochemistry, toxicology, and medicine, and who may also 
understand the regulatory process for getting a drug to market 
better than academic scientists. Although corporate funding may 
influence research outcomes in some cases, a scientist’s financial 
interest may prove irrelevant if the scientist follows the dictates of 
responsible research. 
The universally held norms of scientific inquiry in pursuit of 
the truth make other relationships inconsequential so long as 
scientists are totally and uncompromisingly invested in that 
pursuit. One could argue that scientists who violate the canons of 
their discipline would soon become pariahs—outcasts in their 
professional circles. Whatever a scientist might gain in financial 
reward, for example, is hardly worth the loss of professional 
standing. If this is the case, then how do we explain tobacco 
science, which funded many academic researchers and produced 
volumes of questionable studies to counter the public health 
mobilization against tobacco use?46 
                                                          
44 Misleading or false science is not cognitively objective. 
45 ZIMAN, supra note 3, at 175; See also Ziman, No Conflict, supra note 40, 
at 34. 
46 Lisa A. Bero et al., Publication Bias and Public Health Policy on 
Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 272 JAMA 133, 133-36 (1994) (studying sixty-
five symposium articles and forty-nine peer-reviewed articles concerning 
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A. Manufactured Tobacco Research 
If there were a poster-child for “the best science money could 
buy,” it would certainly be the tobacco industry. Through tobacco 
litigation and the discovery process, internal documents of 
cigarette manufacturers became public and revealed a systematic 
campaign to construct a science around tobacco safety while 
attempting to dismiss as “junk science” findings that connect 
tobacco use to excess morbidity and mortality.47 
In July 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) published 
a particularly comprehensive report detailing the strategies used by 
the tobacco industry to manufacture its own science.48 The report 
was based largely on internal company documents released during 
litigation. It showed that the science produced by tobacco funding 
was the product of research by the industry’s hired staff as well as 
“a variety of ostensibly independent quasi-academic, public policy, 
and business organizations whose tobacco industry funding was 
not disclosed.”49 The report also showed that tobacco companies 
attempted to undermine the WHO by “rel[ying] heavily on 
international and scientific experts with hidden financial ties to the 
industry.”50 
Some of the tactics used by the tobacco companies to support 
their claims included placing articles in the medical literature 
without revealing their support for the research; financing a large 
number of studies intended to show that studies by the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) were flawed; 
planning a series of studies, literature reviews, and scientific 
conferences conducted by front organizations or consultants; and 
seeking to create an ostensibly independent coalition of scientists 
                                                          
tobacco smoke and finding sponsorship can influence results). 
47 See THOMAS ZELTNER ET AL., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL 
ACTIVITIES AT THE WORLD HEALTH AT THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION: 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS 
iii (2000), available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/who_inquiry.pdf. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 3. 
50 Id. 
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to criticize studies that linked tobacco to disease.51 Tobacco 
companies also funded international seminars involving other 
industries to develop “good epidemiological practices”—a 
euphemism for changing the standards of scientific proof that 
would serve cigarette manufacturers when they lobbied to prevent 
increased restrictions on tobacco.52 
Evidence shows that research funded by the tobacco industry 
was designed as advocacy science. The so-called independent 
centers created by tobacco companies to fund research on indoor 
air, including studies of environmental tobacco smoke, also were 
found to be producing advocacy science.53 Similarly, studies 
supported by tobacco companies on the effects of nicotine or 
smoking on cognitive performance invariably reported positive 
effects.54 Nonetheless, there was no dearth of academic scientists, 
including some at Harvard and Yale, willing to accept the funding 
of the tobacco industry for scientific research that would support 
                                                          
51 Id. at 49-52. 
52 Elisa K. Ong & Stanton A. Glantz, Constructing “Sound Science” and 
“Good Epidemiology”: Tobacco, Lawyers, and Public Relations Firms, 91 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1749-57 (2001). Phillip-Morris seized on the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association (CMA) study annunciating principles for “sound 
science” practices, using the public relations firms Burson-Marsteller and APCO 
to legitimize their own scientific findings on the effects of tobacco. Id. at 1751-
53. These efforts were undertaken in retaliation to the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer (IARC), and their efforts to spearhead smoking restrictions 
in Europe by questioning “junk-science” utilized by tobacco manufacturers. Id; 
See also CHEMICAL MFRS. ASSOC., DOCUMENT NO. 2024005575/5604, 
GUIDELINES FOR EPIDEMIOLOGY PRACTICES FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVTL. 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC RESEARCH (1991), available at http://www.pmdocs.com. 
53 Deborah. E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Industry-Funded Research and 
Conflict of Interest: An Analysis of Research Sponsored by the Tobacco Industry 
Through the Center for Indoor Air Research, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 515 
(1996). Much of the industry-sponsored research on environmental tobacco 
smoke was later published in non-peer reviewed journals. Id. at 520-24. The 
quality of those articles proved to be inferior to articles published in peer-
reviewed journals. Id. at 526-28. 
54 Christina Turner & George J. Spilich, Research Into Smoking or Nicotine 
and Human Cognitive Performance: Does the Source of Funding Make a 
Difference?, 92 ADDICTION 1423, 1426 (Nov. 1997). 
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tobacco’s interests.55 
Financial interest by scientists undoubtedly affects the popular 
culture’s perception of scientific reliability. However, we must 
examine the effect of financial interests on science itself, not 
merely the perception of this impact. This question can be explored 
by investigating whether there is a funding effect in science. 
Clearly, such an effect is present in “tobacco science.”56 Still, we 
must consider whether the same effect appears in other sectors of 
science. More importantly, we must evaluate the possible 
implications of such a funding effect on the judiciary, which seeks 
independent scientific expertise to guide the administration of 
justice. If there is evidence that financial interests play a role in the 
outcome of science, then we must question whether “conflict of 
interest” is simply a problem of perception and its antidote is mere 
disclosure or transparency. 
B. The Funding Effect in Drug Studies 
The question of whether funding affects scientific outcomes 
had not been systematically studied prior to the 1990s. The reasons 
are rather complex. Those who questioned the legitimacy of 
science or its objectivity were largely from the new post-modernist 
field of literary scholarship or the new feminist critique of science. 
The former attacked the objective framework of science that 
claims to find a single “text” for explaining the nature of the 
universe, whereas the latter saw a gender bias in the epistemology 
of science.57 
By the 1990s, publicity regarding conflicts of interest, 
especially in the biomedical sciences, prompted investigations into 
the relationship between commercial ties and research outcomes.58 
Among the most impressive of these investigations was a 1998 
                                                          
55 Derek Yach & Stella A. Bialous, Junking Science to Promote Tobacco, 
91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1745 (2001). 
56 See infra notes 45-46 and 52-55. 
57 See, e.g., SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? 
(1991). 
58 See e.g., infra Table, at 67. 
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study performed by a team of Canadian researchers.59 The 
Canadian team examined the degree to which industry support of 
medical education and sponsorship of research influenced the 
opinions and behaviors of clinicians and researchers. The team’s 
study followed in the footsteps of a Canadian television 
documentary that highlighted a conflict of interest between the 
Health Protection Branch of Health and Welfare Canada and the 
manufacturers of calcium channel antagonists (CCAs), a new 
generation of drugs used for hypertension and cardiac problems. 
An ongoing controversy over the safety and efficacy of CCAs 
provided a natural experiment. The Canadian team sought to 
determine whether commercial ties to drug manufacturers played 
any role in explaining the attitudes of journal authors regarding the 
risks of the drugs. 
First, the Canadian research group collected journal articles 
and letters to the editor on CCAs that were published between 
March 1995 and September 1996.60 The group compiled seventy 
usable published documents, including original research, reviews, 
and letters for its study.61 Second, the group identified the authors 
listed in the documents and classified them by the content of their 
writings.62 The authors were categorized as critical, neutral, or 
supportive of the use of CCAs.63 Third, the research group sent out 
a survey to authors to learn whether they had any financial 
associations with any of the forty companies that manufacture 
CCAs or a competing product.64 
The study confirmed the team’s hypothesis that supporters of 
CCAs were more likely than others to have financial relationships 
with manufacturers of this class of drugs.65 The study showed that 
96 percent of authors identified as supportive had financial 
                                                          
59 Henry T. Stelfox et al., Conflict of Interest in the Debate Over Calcium-
Channel Antagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 (1998). 
60 Id. at 104-6. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. Financial associations include travel support, honorarium, educational 
funds, research grant, consultation, etc. 
65 Stelfox, supra note 59, at 104-6. 
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relationships with manufacturers of CCAs, while only 60 percent 
of neutral authors and 37 percent of critical authors had such 
affiliations.66 The study also demonstrated that supporters of CCAs 
were more likely than other authors to have financial relationships 
with any pharmaceutical manufacturer. The investigators 
discovered that 100 percent of supportive authors, 67 percent of 
neutral authors, and 43 percent of critical authors had relationships 
with pharmaceutical manufacturers.67 The team’s hypothesis that 
critics of CCAs were more likely than others to have financial 
relationships with manufacturers of competing products proved 
false. In fact, authors critical of CCAs were much less likely to be 
financially associated with manufacturers of competing products.68 
The research group concluded that there was “a strong association 
between author published positions on the safety of calcium-
channel antagonists and their financial relationships with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers.”69 The Canadian study is one of 
several studies published within the last decade that have identified 
a funding effect in the biomedical sciences that could have serious 
health effects on the consumer population. 
One Yale University research team pooled all of the studies 
available in a type of meta-analysis on the impacts of financial 
conflicts of interest in biomedical research.70 Based on eleven 
independent studies, the research team determined that “strong and 
consistent evidence shows that industry sponsored research tends 
to draw pro-industry conclusions.”71 
The data from the studies tells a convincing story that 
commercial affiliation of researchers has a biasing effect—not 
simply on each investigator, but also on the general population of 
investigators. It imposes a kind of evolutionary pressure that steers 
the research toward the interests of the sponsors. This bias can 
often be subtle and difficult to detect, even for veteran journal 
editors. Frank Davidoff, former editor of the Annals of Internal 
                                                          
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 See Bekelman, supra note 73, at 463. 
71 Id. 
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Medicine, believes the issue is one of transparency. Recalling an 
instance in which he and his staff questioned an author’s overstated 
description of statistical evidence in a sponsored study, Davidoff 
explained: 
The problem for me was not that the trial sponsor had an 
interest in how the study was conducted and reported—that 
was natural enough, given its sizeable financial investment. 
The problem was that details of the sponsor’s involvement 
in and control over research done by ‘independent’ 
investigators weren’t being made known to editors, 
reviewers, and readers.72 
In Davidoff’s view, once the relationship between the researcher 
and the corporate funder of the study has been disclosed, the 
editor’s responsibility ends.73 
The response doubtlessly would be far different in another 
sector of our society, be it government, journalism, or law. Imagine 
if a judge prefaced his remarks during the sentencing phase of a 
trial by declaring that he would be sentencing the convicted felon 
to time in a for-profit prison in which he, the judge, had some 
                                                          
72 Frank Davidoff, Between the Lines: Navigating the Uncharted Territory 
of Industry-Sponsored Research, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 235, 236 (2002). 
73 Id. at 236. Davidoff writes: 
The title of the page of the study we received in 1995 made the fact of 
industry support quite clear; the trial was well conducted, and the drug 
it tested, potentially important. The problem lay buried in the text. It 
seemed to me, my fellow editors, and our statistician that the authors 
had gone well beyond the data in stating the drug’s efficacy and safety. 
I suggested alternative wording that we felt was more appropriate, but 
the author’s revision still contained the original wording. I tried again, 
but the second revision also came back unchanged. I then called the 
lead author to find out what was going on. 
He made no bones about the fact that the drug company sponsoring the 
research had reserved the right to review the manuscript before it was 
submitted—something that had not been disclosed to us. When I 
pushed him about how much control the company had over the paper’s 
wording, things got a little murkier. The principal researchers had 
nominally retained control, he said, but the company’s opinion did very 
likely influence the report’s language. 
Id. 
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personal equity. Moreover, the judge rationalized that, by 
augmenting his modest government salary in this way, he could 
better serve the public interest and act more objectively. With this 
scenario in mind, we must question whether the disclosure of 
financial involvement is sufficient to protect the interests of society 
and the public’s investment in university science. 
III. SCIENCE AND THE JUDICIARY 
What implications do issues of scientific conflict of interest 
have on judicial processes? Trial lawyers choose their own experts 
who must pass the Daubert test in federal courts.74 Generally, a 
scientist’s financial relationship to the subject matter of his or her 
research is not a matter of material concern in a Daubert hearing. 
However, at trial and under cross examination, all factors affecting 
the scientist’s credibility and objectivity are teased out for the jury, 
including whether the expert has more than an intellectual or 
professional interest in the field of knowledge he or she brings to 
the court. 
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Ninth Circuit 
cited the objectivity of the expert witness as a relevant criterion 
pertaining to whether the testimony was based on pre-litigation or 
post-litigation science.75 The court ruled that the timing of the 
research used in the testimony was relevant in applying the 
Daubert criteria: 
That an expert testifies based on research he has conducted 
independent of the litigation provides important, objective 
proof that the research comports with the dictates of good 
science. For one thing, experts whose findings flow from 
existing research are less likely to have been biased toward 
a particular conclusion by the promise of 
remuneration . . . .76 
Still, there is no evidence that pre-litigation research is more 
                                                          
74 For an explanation of the Daubert test, see supra note 14. 
75 43 F.3d. 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). 
76 Id. at 1317 (internal citations omitted). 
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dependable or objective than post-litigation research.77 As 
previously indicated, however, evidence shows that private 
funding of research introduces bias and compromises objectivity.78 
Under Daubert, judges have a daunting task in deciding whether 
expert evidence is relevant and reliable. To add “objective” to that 
list would bring the court into a “hornet’s nest” of issues related to 
conflict of interest and bias—forcing courts to grapple with the 
link between moral purity of research and scientific epistemology. 
Litigation science has financial rewards and, as such, is 
considered a disclosable financial interest (except in the rare 
situation where the scientist does the work pro-bono or at no cost). 
However, non-litigation science may also be connected with 
financial interests.79 Thus, the criterion of pre- or post-litigation 
science may be less relevant than the nature of the financial 
interests and the availability of evidence that such interests impair 
the objectivity of the scientist. 
The government’s own policies on conflicts of interest and 
scientific advisory committees have been less than exemplary. For 
example, consider that there are two rules that guide the 
appointment of experts to federal advisory committees: (1) 
scientists with substantial conflicts of interest in the subject matter 
of the advisory committee should not be allowed to serve; and (2) 
the first rule can be waived.80 Waivers of conflict of interest issues 
can be significant, as demonstrated by a study carried out by USA 
Today.81 Investigative journalists of USA Today examined eighteen 
expert advisory committees established by the Food and Drug 
                                                          
77 See Sheila Jasanoff, Hidden Experts: Judging Science After Daubert, in 
Trying Times: Science and Responsibilities After Daubert 30-47 (Vivian Weil 
ed., 2001). Jasanoff states: “[T]he assumption that science is more biased if it 
emerges from post-litigation than from pre-litigation remains, at the very least, 
more doubtful than Kosinski’s opinion suggested.” Id. at 34. 
78 See infra Table, at 67. 
79 Id. 
80 The Food and Drug Administration reportedly waves conflicts of interest 
of up to $100,000 for members of its advisory committees. See 
www.fda.gov/fda/special/newdrug/advice.html. 
81 See, e.g., Anonymous, How the Study was Done, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 
2000. 
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Administration’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
between 1998 and 2000.82 These committees make 
recommendations to the FDA on drug approval. There were 159 
meetings during this study period.83 At least one advisory 
committee member had a financial stake in the subject under 
review in 146 of the 159 meetings.84 At 50 percent of the meetings, 
at least half of the advisory committee members had financial 
interests in the products being evaluated.85 The study also reported 
that “more than half of the experts hired to advise the government 
on the safety and effectiveness of medicine have financial 
relationships with the pharmaceutical companies that will be 
helped or hurt by their decisions.”86 
Similarly, court-appointed panels of experts charged with 
advising the judiciary should also be vetted under conflict of 
interest guidelines. When Judge Sam Pointer of the U.S. District 
Court in Alabama accepted the appointment of Canadian 
rheumatologist Dr. Peter Tugwell to review scientific claims of 
disease causation in the breast implant litigation, he decided that 
the candidate’s financial relationship and ongoing discussions with 
two of the defendants in the case did not disqualify Dr. Tugwell 
from serving on the panel.87 In his deposition, the medical expert 
responded to the plaintiff’s attorney regarding his relationship with 
a drug company: 
Attorney: So as I understand it . . . as of January 11, 1999, 
while serving on the science panel, you had entered into 
two contracts with Bristol-Myers Squibb, is that correct, the 
consulting contract and the contract relating to the clinical 
trial? 
Tugwell: Again, this connection you’re making is, in my 
                                                          
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. See also Dennis Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 25, 2000, at A1. 
86 Dennis Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 
2000, at A1. 
87 This case is discussed in KRIMSKY, supra note 19, at 135-39. 
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opinion, not relevant because my involvement in the breast 
silicone implant litigation is in no way related with any 
discussion I had with anyone else either in Bristol-Myers 
Squibb or any other company.88 
In response to the plaintiff’s motion to vacate Dr. Tugwell’s 
appointment to the National Science Panel because of his conflicts 
of interest, Judge Pointer concluded that no conflict of interest 
existed and that Dr. Tugwell had acted neutrally, objectively, and 
impartially.89 In cases such as these, it is worth questioning 
whether the standards for impartiality were as high for the 
selection of jurors as they were for the members of the expert 
panel. 
The scientific community, government agencies, and scholarly 
journals have largely accepted the idea that transparency is the 
only meaningful and practical response to conflicts of interest. If 
we apply the same concept to the judiciary, we might again 
imagine a situation in which a sentencing judge discloses his 
equity interest in a for-profit prison. Of course, this scenario seems 
quite ridiculous and it is hard to imagine that judges, politicians, 
and journalists could redeem themselves of conflicting interests by 
simple disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
Considering that the disclosure of conflicts of interest fails to 
provide an adequate solution in the judicial setting, it follows that 
mere disclosure may also prove insufficient to protect the integrity 
of scientific research. In fact, evidence shows that even though the 
norms and conduct of science are believed to conform to a set of 
universal and inviolable principles, they are not insulated from 
financial conflicts of interest. Thus, the judiciary could benefit 
from an understanding of the means by which advocacy science 
surreptitiously enters the courtroom and the ways in which this 
                                                          
88 Deposition of Dr. Peter Tugwell, Apr. 5, 1999, at 116, In re Silicone Gel 
Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, 174 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (N.D Ala., 
2001) (No. CV-92-N-10000-S). 
89 KRIMSKY, supra note 19, at 138. 
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science is distinct from science that is not designed to support a 
predetermined financial interest. 
In his dissenting opinion in the Bendectin case in 2000, Justice 
Ronald Castille of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the 
accepted methodology for studying Bendectin’s effects on the fetus 
was principally supported by a drug company.90 He wrote that the 
pharmaceutical company “largely created the ‘generally accepted 
orthodoxy’ that would freeze out viewpoints contrary to their 
litigation interests . . . [and thus] subsidized or otherwise 
influenced most of the studies that concluded that Bendectin does 
not cause birth defects.”91 
Justice Castille correctly identified a corporate research 
strategy that has been used to fund core methodologies and 
develop standards of proof that support the long-term financial 
interests of companies. This strategy has been used to address a 
variety of scientific issues, including low dose effects, second-hand 
smoke, endocrine disrupting chemicals, ambient air quality, global 
warming, and even punitive damage awards by juries. For 
example, in 1994, an Alaskan federal jury awarded $5.3 billion in 
punitive damages to individuals who were adversely affected by 
the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spill.92 Exxon funded studies by 
several academic social scientists who eventually published papers 
challenging the competence of juries to set punitive damages 
fairly.93 Those papers were then used by Exxon to support its 
appeal of the damage award.94 Several scientists who signed on 
with the company declared their independence.95 According to the 
L.A. Times, however, one social scientist contacted by Exxon to 
                                                          
90 Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 16-17 (Pa. 2000) 
(Castille, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 16. Judge Castille wrote: “There is something not a little offensive 
about an entity, creating a biased, litigation-driven scientific ‘orthodoxy,’ and 
then being permitted to silence any qualified expert holding a dissenting view on 
the grounds of ‘unorthodoxy’.” Id. at 17. 
92 Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, 
at A1. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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write an article reported that the company explicitly told him it was 
looking for articles that could be used in court to argue that juries 
were not competent to make punitive awards.96 
There are similar cases of corporate funding of research in risk 
analysis, toxicology, and epidemiology, in which financial support 
is aimed at establishing baseline principles that set a high burden 
of proof for demonstrating causal relationships in public and 
occupational health with the hope of defining standards that will be 
used in future litigation. Under Daubert, federal judges would 
benefit from not only being informed about the scientific standards 
of the specific disciplines from which expertise is drawn, but also 
about the ways in which corporate stakeholder interests may 
socially construct those standards. Given the growing evidence that 
advocacy science has a potentially distorting effect on scientific 
objectivity, the funding effect in science should be no less relevant 
to trial judges than considerations of whether a scientific analysis 
has been peer reviewed, whether a meta-analysis of data is reliable, 
or whether a technique has a known error rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
96 Id. at A1. 
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Table 1 (“The Funding Effect in Science”) 
Source Journal Focus of the Study Conclusion 
Journal of 
General Internal 
Medicine 
conflicts of interest 
and research results 
“authors with COI were 10-20 
times less likely to present 
negative findings than those 
without COI”97 
Journal of 
General Internal 
Medicine 
funding and the 
outcome of clinical 
trials 
“in no case was a therapeutic 
agent manufactured by the 
sponsoring company found to be 
inferior to an alternative product 
manufactured by another 
company”98  
Journal of the 
American 
Medical 
Association 
effect of research 
funding in randomized 
drug trials 
“conclusions of trials were 
significantly more likely to 
recommend the experimental 
drug as the treatment of choice if 
trials were funded by for-profit 
organizations”99 
Journal of the 
American 
Medical 
Association 
impact of financial 
conflicts of interest in 
biomedical research 
“evidence suggests that financial 
ties that intertwine industry, 
investigators, and academic 
institutions can influence the 
research process”100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
97 Lee S. Friedman & Elihu D. Richter, Relationship Between Conflicts of 
Interest and Research Results, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 51, 54 (2004). The 
study found this “relationship was strongest among studies investigating drug 
treatments.” Id. 
98 R. A. Davidson, Source of Funding and Outcome of Clinical Trials, 1 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 155, 158 (1986) (concluding that studies sponsored by 
pharmaceutical companies were more likely to favor the new therapy). 
99 Bodil Als-Nielson et al., Association of Funding and Conclusions in 
Randomized Drug Trials, 290 JAMA 921, 925 (2003). 
100 Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of 
Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 JAMA 454, 463 (2003) (finding that 
“industry-sponsored research tends to draw pro-industry conclusions”). 
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Source Journal Focus of the Study Conclusion 
Journal of the 
American 
Medical 
Association 
potential conflict of 
interest in trials of new 
oncology drugs 
“[s]tudies funded by 
pharmaceutical companies were 
nearly 8 times less likely to 
research unfavorable qualitative 
conclusions than nonprofit-
funded studies and 1.4 times 
more likely to reach favorable 
qualitative conclusions”101 
British Medical 
Journal 
randomized clinical 
trials published in the 
British Medical 
Journal 
“[a]uthors’ conclusions . . . 
significantly favoured 
experimental interventions if 
financial competing interests 
were declared”102 
Family Practice randomized controlled 
drug trials 
showing “an association between 
financial support of published 
RCTs by commercial interests 
and outcomes favouring the use 
of products being tested”103 
Addiction smoking or nicotine 
and human cognitive 
performance 
“researchers acknowledging 
tobacco industry support were 
considerably more likely to 
arrive at a conclusion favorable 
to the tobacco industry than were 
researchers not acknowledging 
industry support”104 
 
                                                          
101 Mark Friedberg et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic 
Analyses of New Drugs Used in Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1455 (1999). 
102 Lisa L. Kjaergard et al., Association Between Competing Interests and 
Authors’ Conclusions: Epidemiological Study of Randomized Clinical Trials 
Published in the BMJ, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 249, 249 (2002) (also noting that 
“[o]ther competing interests were not significantly associated with authors’ 
conclusions”). 
103 John Yaphe et al., The Association Between Funding By Commercial 
Interests and Study Outcome in Randomized Controlled Drug Trials, 18 FAMILY 
PRACTICE 565, 567 (2001). 
104 Christina Turner & George J. Spilich, Research into Smoking or 
Nicotine and Human Cognitive Performance: Does the Source of Funding Make 
a Difference?, 92 ADDICTION 1423, 1426 (1997). 
